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TALLRITE BLOG 

Write to blog@tallrite.com

Drowning in Oily Mistakes

Technical and foolish mistakes found in the book entitled
Drowning in Oil: BP & the Relentless Pursuit of Profit - A Review
by Loren C Steffy, McGraw-Hill; 1 edition (November 5, 2010)

Page

Avoidable Mistakes and Technical Errors

xv

Public mistrust of oil companies in the America grew ...”  The definite article should not be there (especially not on the very first page of text).

2

BP’s 35,000 foot Tiber well in the Gulf of Mexico was not “the deepest well in history” (p2).  That honour belongs to the USSR which over nineteen long years in the 1970s and 80s drilled the Kola Superdeep Borehole to a vertical depth 40,230 feet in Siberia. In Qatar in 2008, well BD-04A was drilled to an even greater length, 40, 318 feet, but this included a 35,768 foot horizontal section, so reached nothing like the massive depth of Kola. 

The Macondo field is not an ancient graveyard of decomposed dinosaurs.  Macondo’s oil and gas, like all hydrocarbons, were formed from decomposed marine life (such as phytoplankton, algae and bacteria) which died in largely the Triassic, Jurassic and Cretaceous  periods, 245-145 million years ago, albeit when dinosaurs roamed on land. 

And no oilfield is “a massive underground pool”; oil is found within in the tiny spaces of porous rocks.

3

Gas inflows do not “kick at the drill pipe” – they push fluid in spurts (“kicks”) up the inside of the drill pipe. 

Ixtoc, a Mexican well in the Gulf which blew out in 1979 and whose oil reached over 160 miles of Texas beaches did not “taint” (or “sully” – p180) them ; it devastated them, and marine life, though the environment eventually recovered.  Mr Steffy seems to be downplaying Ixtoc to make Macondo look worse. 

4

BP may have been “spending half-a-million dollars a day for the Horizon”, but the total spread cost (including services, boats, helicopters etc) would have been double that.  Therefore a delay of 1½ months would have amounted to a budget overrun of some $45m, not $20m as stated.  ($40m eventually appears on p165). 

5

Drilling mud doesn’t “lubricate the well” and does a lot more than “tamp down the pressure”.  It lubricates the drilling bit, removes cuttings, and plasters the wall of the hole. 

Drilling too quickly” does not cause mud loss.  The only thing that does is when the mud pressure is greater than the formation pressure, the plastering is unable to contain the mud, and the formation cracks under the stress allowing mud to flow into the openings and/or into the pores instead of returning to surface. 

The drilling crew did not pump mud “out of the hole” and replace it with seawater.    They did this to the riser, the big pipe that connects the rig to the wellhead on the seabed.  The same mistake is made on p173 and 175. 

This should not have been done until the well was not only “capped” (as stated), but dead beneath the cap, ie the mud in the hole was heavy enough to prevent inflow, augmented by a cement plug as additional safety. 

The main reason for displacing the riser (not the hole) from mud to seawater is not to recover the mud but to avoid polluting the sea with mud. 

6

Interesting that roustabout Stephen Stone apparently finished his 12-hour shift and went straight to bed, not even stopping for meal. 

7

 The “huge machines … pump mud” not “from the well” but into it. 

8

Drilling fluid would have been shooting not “from the top of the derrick” but to it. 

10

The nightmare well, with its mile-long conduit into the belly of the earth” in fact measured 5023 feet (0.95 miles) to the seabed plus a further 13,337 feet (over 2½ miles) to the bottom of the well. 

12

Mike Williams, an injured survivor, found his “left leg useless” but in the next paragraph “got to his feet”. 

22 & 28

London’s tony St. James Square” – should that be “tiny”? 

A curious “tony” reappears on p28. 

25

It isn’t only wells in 5,000 feet of water that require remote operated submarines, as inferred.  No diver can work beyond a thousand feet, if that.  From then on it’s got to be remote operated vehicles (ROVs). 

36

Strange avoidance of the concise term “Hungarian Jewess” in favour of “Hungarian of Jewish descent”, in referring to Lord Browne’s mother. 

39

BP’s pioneering and speedy development in the 1970s of the North Sea’s first elephant, the five-platform Forties field, was anything but the product of a “plodding, risk-averse culture”.  

57

To say that Piper Alpha was destroyed by the ignition of “gas from a ruptured line” is misleading.  The disaster was initiated by a leak of condensate which exploded, causing an oil fire which in due course heated gas risers causing them to fail and this in turn allowed the gas to ignite and explode. 

58

Forties Alpha was an offshore production platform not a “drilling rig”, though it contained one. 

159

Water is lighter than oil”.  Not it’s not!  This error makes a nonsense of the accompanying explanation of fluids flowing in a reservoir. 

166

ALL wells, not just those which are “modern” and “drilled far offshore”, are “far more complex” than “a shaft of metal piercing the ground”. 

From p166, the author repeatedly uses “drill string” when he should say “production string”.  The drill string is used solely for drilling.  The production string is the final, ie innermost, casing cemented in the hole. 

Dick Cheney became a “lightning rod for controversy” over Halliburton only after he left Halliburton to become US VP and had divested himself of all stock and interests.  

167

Where the liner is hung off inside the larger casing, cement is not used to pack off or seal the two together.  The liner is cemented to the hole wall from the bottom up; the two pipes are sealed to each other at the top of the liner by activating seals made of rubber and lead. 

The tie back is not an alternative to the liner; it is an optional addition to the liner – it “ties back” the liner to the wellhead to provide a continuous production string from bottom to top. 

168

 The centralizer controversy is curious: centralizers are cheap to buy and quick to install.  The shortage of fittings was doubtless why the number was not increased – to fetch more would have led to a helicopter trip and several hours delay, and much embarrassment.

169

 Surely BP had a shore-based engineer with absolute authority to take such decisions (eg on centralizers)?

The “loss of circulation” was extremely serious.  It is almost inconceivable that cementation operations would proceed without first rectifying this. 

171

This kind of higher level planning meeting would never have been taking place in the “drillers shack” but in the main accommodation/office module.  

172

Cementing a well a mile below the surface of the water is as much art as science”.  No it’s not; it’s nearly all science. 

·         And this cementation took place 3½ miles below the surface. 

·         And it is not/cannot be “spread at particular points”.  It is all pumped out of the bottom of the liner or casing and works its way up the outside. 

·         And cement is not “poured” into the hole, it is pumped. 

173

 It is not “time-consuming” to evaluate a cement bond log: you can visually interpret what it says at once.  Nor was the cement job “temporary”; it was permanent. 

174

The toolpusher does a lot more than “oversee the materials and personnel”.  He is the rig owner’s senior representative, responsible both for the integrity of the rig and for ensuring BP’s instructions are executed. 

175

An “hour-long discussion” on a rig consuming $1m/day would cost BP $40,000, not as stated “a half-million dollars”. 

178

The author needs to define what he means by “worst spill ever in American waters”.  The quantity of oil spilled may have been more, but the environmental and wildlife damage it did was certainly far less than done by the Exxon Valdez and arguably less than Ixtoc’s.  Macondo was less damaging because

·         the crude was more volatile than that carried by the Valdez,

·         was far offshore allowing it to spread and biodegrade more readily,

·         the weather conditions were warm which further enhanced degradation,

·         dispersants were applied liberally both on the surface and at depth, and 

·         there was a massive effort to protect the seashore through booms

181

Oil prices – including futures – are driven primarily by OPEC.  The price of everything is driven by something. 

Oil company collaboration does not reduce the fierce competition in those areas where they do not collaborate. 

The three parties then hired a litany of contractors”.  No they didn’t.  Only BP, as operator for the three, did the hiring. 

A [major] rig operator may have fewer than 20 customers worldwide”.  This is wildly underestimated. 

183,
184 & 185

Confusion over volumes and units as noted above. 

Regarding Macondo volumes, the author should have noted that nothing was properly measured.  Nearly every figure bandied about, from 2,000 bbl/day to 80,000 or more, was based on nothing other than humans eyeballing the flow as depicted by underwater TV cameras and comparing this – by memory – with measured flows they might once have seen on dry land.  This involved no science whatsoever. 

186

While BP’s response to the Horizon disaster may have been …”. 
Should read “the Texas City refinery disaster”.

191 & 227

Two very limited and poor descriptions of what was a singularly brilliant project in the way the BP team brought Macondo back under control.  The author clearly hasn’t a clue about this and didn’t bother to find out. 

200

The Horizon’s [BOP stack] was on the seafloor a mile below the surface and accessible only by remote underwater submarines”.  And, more significantly, by the control systems.  ROV inspections are rarely required. 

208

If the fishermen were so devastated by Macondo, where was the TV footage showing dock after dock full of idle fishing boats?  (Answer: BP employed most of them for booming, clean-up etc).

209

There weren’t many tarballs, especially compared with the Exxon Valdez crop.  President Obama in a famous photo-op only seemed to find one of them. 

212

Oil does not “inundate” the land, not unless all the pipelines rupture together. 

218

The Congressional Committee “would expect contrition” but would not get it.  But on the same page, BP’s Tony Hayward is reported as saying “I’m deeply sorry”. 

219

The author seems surprised that Mr Haywood would attempt to protect both BP and his job. 

228

The capping of Macondo by BP was not “a small victory”.  It was a massive, historic victory. 

230 & 235

United Kingdom” always takes a definite article.  (Just as “the America” - on page xv - does not!)

241

The basic design (of drilling wells) hadn’t changed for 90 years”.  That’s because the problem it solves hasn’t.  Similarly, the basic design of cars hasn’t changed for 90 years, for the same reason. 

244

As regards maintenance schedules for BOPs, the first port of call should be Cameron the manufacturer

247

The final killing of Macondo through relief wells was not “symbolic”.  It was actual, and by the way another remarkable technical accomplishment. 

248

There was no “infamous Piper Alpha blowout”.  The platform was destroyed by a fire cause by escaped condensate and, later, gas.  The wells were shut off by their automatic subsurface safety valves and played no part in the disaster. 

The drill bit is turned at an angle as it nears the problem well”.  In fact it is steered throughout its course towards its target. 

A description of how the relief wells were actually drilled and steered would fascinate many readers. 

249

Some people’s livelihoods may have been “devastated” but most were merely suspended.  There is no evidence of long term damage to fishing areas.

251

That the Gulf’s richest but most difficult fields should end up concentrated “in the hands of just a few giant companies" is not unusual in costly high-tech businesses.  Just look at Boeing and Airbus. 

257

The author is incorrect to infer that there is something intrinsically wrong with striving to get “more for less”.  In fact it is admirable, provided minimum standards are adequately defined and met.  

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 What I've recently
been reading

The Lemon Tree, by Sandy Tol, 2006
“The Lemon Tree”, by Sandy Tol (2006),
is a delightful novel-style history of modern Israel and Palestine told through the eyes of a thoughtful protagonist from either side, with a household lemon tree as their unifying theme.

But it's not entirely honest in its subtle pro-Palestinian bias, and therefore needs to be read in conjunction with an antidote, such as
The Case for Israel, Alan Dershowitz, 2004

See detailed review

+++++

Drowning in Oil - Macondo Blowout
This
examines events which led to BP's 2010 Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. 

BP's ambitious CEO John Browne expanded it through adventurous acquisitions, aggressive offshore exploration, and relentless cost-reduction that trumped everything else, even safety and long-term technical sustainability.  

Thus mistakes accumulated, leading to terrifying and deadly accidents in refineries, pipelines and offshore operations, and business disaster in Russia.  

The Macondo blowout was but an inevitable outcome of a BP culture that had become poisonous and incompetent. 

However the book is gravely compromised by a litany of over 40 technical and stupid errors that display the author's ignorance and carelessness. 

It would be better to wait for the second (properly edited) edition before buying. 

As for BP, only a wholesale rebuilding of a new, professional, ethical culture will prevent further such tragedies and the eventual destruction of a once mighty corporation with a long and generally honourable history.

Note: I wrote my own reports on Macondo
in
May, June, and July 2010

+++++

Published in April 2010; banned in Singapore

A horrific account of:

bullet

how the death penalty is administered and, er, executed in Singapore,

bullet

the corruption of Singapore's legal system, and

bullet

Singapore's enthusiastic embrace of Burma's drug-fuelled military dictatorship

More details on my blog here.

+++++

Product Details
This is nonagenarian Alistair Urquhart’s incredible story of survival in the Far East during World War II.

After recounting a childhood of convention and simple pleasures in working-class Aberdeen, Mr Urquhart is conscripted within days of Chamberlain declaring war on Germany in 1939.

From then until the Japanese are deservedly nuked into surrendering six years later, Mr Urquhart’s tale is one of first discomfort but then following the fall of Singapore of ever-increasing, unmitigated horror. 

After a wretched journey Eastward, he finds himself part of Singapore’s big but useless garrison.

Taken prisoner when Singapore falls in 1941, he is, successively,

bullet

part of a death march to Thailand,

bullet

a slave labourer on the Siam/Burma railway (one man died for every sleeper laid),

bullet

regularly beaten and tortured,

bullet

racked by starvation, gaping ulcers and disease including cholera,

bullet

a slave labourer stevedoring at Singapore’s docks,

bullet

shipped to Japan in a stinking, closed, airless hold with 900 other sick and dying men,

bullet

torpedoed by the Americans and left drifting alone for five days before being picked up,

bullet

a slave-labourer in Nagasaki until blessed liberation thanks to the Americans’ “Fat Boy” atomic bomb.

Chronically ill, distraught and traumatised on return to Aberdeen yet disdained by the British Army, he slowly reconstructs a life.  Only in his late 80s is he able finally to recount his dreadful experiences in this unputdownable book.

There are very few first-person eye-witness accounts of the the horrors of Japanese brutality during WW2. As such this book is an invaluable historical document.

+++++

Culture of Corruption: Obama and His Team of Tax Cheats, Crooks, and Cronies
Culture of Corruption: Obama and His Team of Tax Cheats, Crooks, and Cronies

This is a rattling good tale of the web of corruption within which the American president and his cronies operate. It's written by blogger Michele Malkin who, because she's both a woman and half-Asian, is curiously immune to the charges of racism and sexism this book would provoke if written by a typical Republican WASP.

With 75 page of notes to back up - in best blogger tradition - every shocking and in most cases money-grubbing allegation, she excoriates one Obama crony after another, starting with the incumbent himself and his equally tricky wife. 

Joe Biden, Rahm Emmanuel, Valerie Jarett, Tim Geithner, Lawrence Summers, Steven Rattner, both Clintons, Chris Dodd: they all star as crooks in this venomous but credible book. 

ACORN, Mr Obama's favourite community organising outfit, is also exposed for the crooked vote-rigging machine it is.

+++++

Superfreakonomics
This much trumpeted sequel to Freakonomics is a bit of disappointment. 

It is really just a collation of amusing little tales about surprising human (and occasionally animal) behaviour and situations.  For example:

bullet

Drunk walking kills more people per kilometer than drunk driving.

bullet

People aren't really altruistic - they always expect a return of some sort for good deeds.

bullet

Child seats are a waste of money as they are no safer for children than adult seatbelts.

bullet

Though doctors have known for centuries they must wash their hands to avoid spreading infection, they still often fail to do so. 

bullet

Monkeys can be taught to use washers as cash to buy tit-bits - and even sex.

The book has no real message other than don't be surprised how humans sometimes behave and try to look for simple rather than complex solutions.

And with a final anecdote (monkeys, cash and sex), the book suddenly just stops dead in its tracks.  Weird.

++++++

False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World
A remarkable, coherent attempt by Financial Times economist Alan Beattie to understand and explain world history through the prism of economics. 

It's chapters are organised around provocative questions such as

bullet

Why does asparagus come from Peru?

bullet

Why are pandas so useless?

bullet

Why are oil and diamonds more trouble than they are worth?

bullet

Why doesn't Africa grow cocaine?

It's central thesis is that economic development continues to be impeded in different countries for different historical reasons, even when the original rationale for those impediments no longer obtains.  For instance:

bullet

Argentina protects its now largely foreign landowners (eg George Soros)

bullet

Russia its military-owned businesses, such as counterfeit DVDs

bullet

The US its cotton industry comprising only 1% of GDP and 2% of its workforce

The author writes in a very chatty, light-hearted matter which makes the book easy to digest. 

However it would benefit from a few charts to illustrate some of the many quantitative points put forward, as well as sub-chaptering every few pages to provide natural break-points for the reader. 

+++++

Burmese Outpost, by Anthony Irwin
This is a thrilling book of derring-do behind enemy lines in the jungles of north-east Burma in 1942-44 during the Japanese occupation.

The author was a member of Britain's V Force, a forerunner of the SAS. Its remit was to harass Japanese lines of command, patrol their occupied territory, carryout sabotage and provide intelligence, with the overall objective of keeping the enemy out of India.   

Irwin is admirably yet brutally frank, in his descriptions of deathly battles with the Japs, his execution of a prisoner, dodging falling bags of rice dropped by the RAF, or collapsing in floods of tears through accumulated stress, fear and loneliness. 

He also provides some fascinating insights into the mentality of Japanese soldiery and why it failed against the flexibility and devolved authority of the British. 

The book amounts to a  very human and exhilarating tale.

Oh, and Irwin describes the death in 1943 of his colleague my uncle, Major PF Brennan.

+++++

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